Halfway through his presidency, what’s the Petro presidency been like? And what comes next?
It’s now two years since Gustavo Petro was elected as Colombia’s first ever true leftwing president. Hopes were high from one side of the Colombian political divide, fears high on the other side. Those in the middle simply expressed concern over his reputation for ineptitude and problem causing.
In a strange way, Petro can be measured more by what he has not done than by what he has. Some of that is good – there has been no collapse of the peso, nor has he made any major blunders. On the other hand, much that was promised is stuck in bureaucracy, unworkable or simply non-existent. He’s also failed to fully take control of the wheel of state.
His predecessor Duque saw his final two and a half years simply play out as a lame duck presiding over chaos. In that respect, Petro is doing a bit better as he prepares to enter the second half of his presidency. However, while there isn’t any panic on the streets of Bogotá, there is the same old feeling of simply looking towards the next election and hoping things improve.
His notoriously combative personality has led to a near-constant series of fights with various parties and some bizarre actions. He’s rarely in Bogotá, often touring the country or the world to make speeches or hold rallies. His predilection for blaming others isn’t easy to get away with when he’s sitting in the Palacio de Nariño.
What is perhaps more interesting for the long term is what happens next. As this government erratically careens through its remaining time in power, will it impact the next election? It’s certainly true that links to Petro are unlikely to be votewinners, but there’s likely an opportunity to ‘do the change properly’. And of course, there’s plenty of room for ‘back to the rightwing’.
El gobierno de cambio
A year ago, we wrote “having swept in on the wind of change, little has actually taken place. The exceptional ability of Colombian politics to stymie and frustrate politics has hit his reforms and they have been mired in the gloop of Senate bureaucracy. He needs to negotiate to get support for his reforms, but is unable or unwilling to find compromise.” All of that remains true.
The flagship measure is health, and that failed. Petro’s response to that was to stymie payments to EPS providers, causing an inordinate number of problems in an attempt to force change. He claims that the healthcare providers have received their payments, they say they haven’t and things came to a head when heavyweight Sura asked to leave the system.
The deadline for a response to that request is September 2nd, and it’s likely to be polemic one way or the other. If it’s denied, it’s unclear what happens next. If it’s accepted it sets a precedent for others to follow suit, with potentially thousands left without healthcare.
Large-scale street protests against the government have yet to happen and it’s looking like they never will. While there have been a few attempts at rebellion, the political right seem to mainly be looking to wait this out. Petro continues to organise large rallies to drum up support for himself, usually from his balcony.
The minimum wage has shot up, with inflation-busting increases over the last two years, and since 2017 it’s now doubled in value, at COP$1.3m a month. With the transport subsidy, it’s nearly one and a half million. There’s also been a decrease in legal working hours, so rights for workers are heading in a positive direction.
It’s the economy, stupid
Perversely, Petro’s inability to get reforms through has meant a relatively stable economic picture. Drastic change is unlikely to take place, leading investors to potentially view the country as relatively low risk. However, there has been reduced interest post-pandemic, especially with a drive to diversify away from resource extraction.
However, the overall outlook is less than sunny. 2023 was ok if wobbly, with a continued post-COVID bounce back still driving growth. That has now slowed, as consumption starts to fall off. 2024 GDP growth is predicted to be somewhere between 1.5 and 2%, below the global average and a far cry from a decade ago in Colombia.
Inflation is falling, but remains stubbornly high and critically, above GDP growth. That means further pain for consumers and further reduced consumption. The dollar has fluctuated around COP$4,000. Most observers predict an economic uptick in 2025, but likely to remain below the numbers in the first part of the century.
Personal fights
With the departure of Claudia López (now angling for the presidency in 2026) as Bogotá mayor, Petro is missing his main sparring partner. The new mayor, Carlos F Galán, hasn’t so far attracted his ire. Though he’s smarting over the poor showing from his comrade Gustavo Bolívar who managed to finish third in a two horse race.
His political rivals have mainly focused on a sort of plan tortuga within the Congress, frustrating and stymieing his attempts to get reforms through. It seems that most of the right wing are prepared to simply wait him out. Towards the end of 2025, expect that to change as jockeying for election starts in earnest.
There was a perplexing bromance between Petro and the polarising Álvaro Uribe in his first few weeks in office. Although that rapidly cooled, there’s been a distinct lack of hostility on both sides. Uribe has popped up occasionally to chip in on certain issues, but is far from the critic you’d expect him to be.
In the absence of congressional attacks, Petro has found himself involved in quite a few spats with journalists. He’s been involved in a long-running feud with FLIP, the press freedom organisation for months and been hostile to all perceived criticism. He’s a fan of propaganda but lukewarm on freedom of expression.
He’s called RCN and Caracol brutalising influences and likened high profile columnists to both Mossad and concentration camp guards. He’s almost completely sidestepped traditional media in all forms, preferring instead to fire off dozens of tweets weekly and set up his own mini newspaper to trumpet his achievements.
Strangely, Petro’s unelected wife, Verónica Alcocer, has disappeared from public view in recent weeks. She’s had an unprecedented presence in the government, going as far as to be an official representative of the country at functions. That seems to be subsiding a bit now, with the First Lady being absent from the recent independence day celebrations.
There was also a squabble over the location of the Panamerican Games in 2027. Originally slated for Barranquilla, the organising committee ripped up the contract after failing to receive sufficient guarantees from the central government. Petro in turn blamed the local administration, who also blamed him.
He’s had a rocky relationship with local politicians in general – largely through his habit of touring the country and often undermining them. He’s criticised costeño leaders for high energy prices and in turn come under fire from regional leaders who say that the central government doesn’t communicate with them.
Foreign policy
Never one to miss an opportunity for grandstanding, Gustavo has given full support to the Palestinian cause. This is at least consistent with his entire political outlook, but has rubbed the Israeli ambassador up the wrong way, among others. He’s broadly in line with global political opinion on this one, although has gone further by breaking diplomatic relations.
More concerning is his reluctance to criticise Nicolás Maduro. Petro took a while to comment and his words were far from harsh. Being charitable, you might say that he’s trying to avoid cornering his Venezuelan counterpart. More cynically, he’s avoiding calling out his old revolutionary mate.
Much of what actually gets done in politics happens under the radar though, and the administration has been quietly getting on top of things in Washington, managing to get some progress with the notorious delay in visa processing in Bogotá has fallen drastically. Of course, the enormous caveat here is that no one knows how a Trump return would play out.
Paz total
Even after two years, there is no real idea what this actually means. The country is getting more dangerous and crime perception is ticking upwards again. It’s also important to note that most Colombians care little about the peace talks – they play well in the foreign press but not locally. Petro wants to talk to everyone, but only three groups have come to the table.
The ELN talks are going nowhere, fast. Petro restarted official talks four months after taking office, but it’s been hard going. There have been frequent suspensions and ongoing points of contention, from funding systems to ceasefire durations to kidnapping. This includes killings of police and military personnel.
Worryingly, those are the talks that are going best. The paramilitary and drug-trafficking groups have either ignored the president or flexed their muscles to warn him off. This is highly concerning. This sort of passive attitude to cartels is precisely what brought Mexico, El Salvador and Ecuador into chaos.
There are two groups of ex-FARC in talks, EMC (Estado Mayor Central) since last year and Segunda Marquetalia for a couple of months. Neither set of talks has produced anything concrete and has seen plenty of showing off from the rebel groups. The peace deal of 2016 is looking ever shakier these days.
All this takes place against a backdrop of increased violence as these various groups operate with impunity, affecting civilians at ever higher rates. Multiple killings and assassinations persist in conflict zones, kidnappings and displacements are up and there are ever more reports of towns being shut down.
Meanwhile, there’s growing discontent over crime perception within cities. The homicide rate hasn’t fallen significantly and robberies are up. High profile incidents in Bogotá saw a spate of violent crime hitting restaurants last year, although the threat has since receded. Still, with cities such as Cali and Bogotá registering crime concerns at 80%+, it’s a problem.
Some actual results
It hasn’t been all doom and gloom. Congress managed to get a bullfighting bill through – after 14 previous attempts, this hasn’t been easy for any administration. It has a fair deal of caveats built into it and doesn’t cover related issues such as cockfighting, but it’s still a notable achievement and was approved 93-2, indicating broad support.
Deforestation rates have fallen massively too, if official data is to be believed. It seems legit, though and is something to be proud of. However, that report notes that the start of 2024 has been very different, so the figures for this year may be grim reading if that continues.
Cocaine exportation has been hard hit in the last two months, with the authorities continuing to break records (.pdf) as they reach around 700 tons of product impounded annually. While this has been a trend over years, it’s improved under Petro’s watch. Partly it’s a simple result of increased production, but credit should go to a renewed focus on the issue.
Scandals
There were plenty in the first year, but things have quietened down considerably over the second year. However, two issues just stagger on like fentanyl zombies through San Francisco streets. There are also signs of odd behaviour.
The first of these is the campaign funding scandal. Benedetti was appointed to a role of ambassador to the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN to keep him out of sight, but that’s far from a resolution. It remains absolutely unclear what his role was in campaign financing after his threatening calls to Laura Sarabia.
Talking of which, the latter’s elaborate trolling of the Colombian people continues, as she’s been reappointed as general director of DAPRE, the president’s admin department. That is her third job under Petro after she was a major part of a bizarre scandal involving allegations of campaign interference, wiretapping, kidnapped nannies and unexplained bags of cash.
Add to that the ongoing saga of Nicolás Petro, the president’s son that he doesn’t take credit for, and there are a lot of unanswered questions over the 2022 campaign. It’s certainly unusual that both Benedetti and Sarabia seem to be unsackable despite serious allegations. However, everything remains shrouded in mystery and nothing is proven.
Perhaps most bizarre are the personal attacks, with repeated claims that he is drunk and/or unwell. While much of this is based on poor quality fake video or adulterated audio, it’s true that he’s often erratic and frequently late or simply absent at official events. This has drawn unwelcome comparisons with doddery Joe Biden.
The VP
Francia Márquez continues to receive both unacceptable criticism and unwarranted praise. Racist abuse is of course deplorable and a lot of people clearly have an issue with a powerful woman of colour. In terms of visibility, she’s a trailblazer and is actively showing that Black women have a place in the echelons of Colombian politics.
However, in purely practical terms, she has an enormous department of state, and is managing not to get anything done with it. She remains far from Bogotá, visiting sporadically for official engagements. Where she was once seen as a potential candidate for the top job, that seems to be sliding. De malas, she might well say.
Her diplomatic trips to Africa have been roaring successes, setting up links with a number of countries and opening new embassies. This is another of the things that flies under the radar, but Colombia now has much stronger links with the continent that will be important for the future.
Future dreams
So, what comes next? Well, there are a few things bubbling away that are worth keeping an eye on. Crime perception is certainly up and this is the sort of thing that you don’t want to see hit a tipping point. There are nowhere near enough jail spaces, either.
The ELN talks are in real danger of simply getting nowhere before Petro leaves office, which would leave them precarious with an incoming president far from guaranteed to continue. Even if they can accelerate, it will be a very, very hard sell to the Colombian public after a history of assassination even throughout the process.
The other talks are between pointless and unhelpful, serving to undermine the peace process on a wider scale. If dissidents can simply return to the forest and from there back to the table, it makes the official system seem useless. For the purely criminal groups, the message appears to be that the government won’t push back too much.
La Niña is looming large on the horizon. It’s now looking extremely likely that the phenomenon will arrive in the next rainy season. It requires a fairly hefty dose of optimism to imagine that the government is well prepared for this, so there may well be news of flooded towns and landslides in the autumn.
One thing that may affect perception of Petro both in office right now and in the annals of history is the US economy. Wall Street is a bit rocky and uncertainty over the upcoming election (not to mention the Trump shadow) doesn’t help that. If the dollar depreciates, Petro will bask in that as though it were his achievement.
Just like last year, the jury remains out on Petro. It seems most likely at present that he will simply waddle through to the end of his term having done more than you might think but not as much as he could have. Like most world leaders, really. A week is a long time in politics though, and especially in Colombia, so there’s always the possibility for some random event to throw everything into disarray. Watch this space.
